Tulsa Law Review
Volume 47
Issue 1 Book Review Issue
Summer 2011

Citizenship under Fire: the Forging of the New Americans
Shruti Rana

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Shruti Rana, Citizenship under Fire: the Forging of the New Americans, 47 Tulsa L. Rev. 31 (2013).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol47/iss1/4

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu.

Rana: Citizenship under Fire: the Forging of the New Americans

CITIZENSHIP UNDER FIRE: THE FORGING OF THE
NEW AMERICANS

Shruti Rana*
ANNA 0. LAW, THE IMMIGRATION BATTLE IN AMERICAN COURTS (Cambridge

Univ. Press 2010). Pp. 280. Hardback. $90.00.
EDIBERTO ROMAN, CITIZENSHIP AND ITS EXCLUSIONS: A CLASSICAL,
CONSTITUTIONAL, AND CRITICAL RACE CRITIQUE (N.Y. Univ. Press 2010). Pp. 224.

Cloth. $45.00.
Immigration law has long occupied a distinctive and rather exceptional position in
American law.1 On one hand, immigration law and its underlying notions of citizenship
are intended to reflect an idealized American democracy, embodying the foundational
myths that have helped shape the concept of America as a repository of freedom and
hope, one where anyone with talent and a little bit of luck can hope to succeed beyond
her or his wildest dreams. 2 The ultimate honor realized through U.S. immigration law is,
of course, the attainment of citizenship and its attendant rights and privileges. 3 On the
other hand, U.S. immigration law has in numerous ways become a repository of hate,
xenophobia, and fear. This strand of immigration jurisprudence has both deliberately and
unconsciously constricted rather than expanded the American notion of citizenship.4
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. The author appreciates the helpful
comments of Mark Graber, Smriti Rana, Song Richardson, Christopher Rickerd, and David Super and the
discussants at Anna Law's Author-Meets-Reader Session at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual
National Conference..
1. See Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology and Predictionfor Our
Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257 (2000); Hiroshi
Motomurad, ImmigrationLaw After a Century ofPlenary Power:Phantom ConstitutionalNorms and Statutory
Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., America's Schizophrenic Immigration
Policy Race, Class, and Reason, 41 B.C. L. REv. 755 (2000); James F. Smith, A Nation that Welcomes
Immigrants? An Historical Examination of United States Immigration Policy, 1 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 227 (1995). See also Peter H. Schuck, The TransformationoflImmigrationLaw, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1
(1984) ("Probably no other area of American law has been so radically insulated and divergent from those
fundamental norms of constitutional right, administrative procedure, and [the] judicial role. . . .").
2. Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at the
Immigrationand NationalityAct of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REv. 273 (1996).
3. EDIBERTO ROMAN, CITIZENSHIP AND ITS EXCLUSIONS: A CLASSICAL, CONSTITUTIONAL, AND CRITICAL
RACE CRITIQUE (2010).

4. Brent K. Newcomb, Immigration Law and the CriminalAlien: A Comparisonof Policiesfor Arbitrary
Deportations of Legal Permanent Residents Convicted of Aggravated Felonies, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 697, 718
(1998) ("Part of the reason for congressional and administrative ill-will towards aliens stems from a general
anti-immigrant sentiment prevalent in the United States. In addition, this sentiment 'blurs the distinction
between legal and illegal migration.' This backlash has prompted Congress to discriminate severely against
both legal and illegal aliens and has spilled over into recent congressional decisions to restrict administrative
and judicial remedies for aliens facing deportation. Throughout this century, America as a whole can be

31

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2011

1

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 47 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 4
32

TULSA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 47:31

Each of these strands has become deeply entrenched, clashing at nearly every level of
political and legal discourse. 5 From a doctrinal perspective, these clashes and their
consequences are only sharpened by the high level of deference the judiciary accords to
the immigration agency: whatever approach the political system takes at a given
juncture is unlikely to be moderated, thereby creating in the immigration arena a "realm
in which government authority is at the zenith and individual entitlement is at the
nadir."6

In recent years, scholars and practitioners sympathetic to immigrants have dealt
with this dichotomy (and the related problem of deference) in two predominant ways.
One is proceduralist, seeking technical means to chip away at restrictive immigration
laws bit by bit to create a more just system. Its vision of justice is highly practical: a
more legally inclusive notion of citizenship, a less arbitrary deportation system, and
fewer denials of human rights. The second response is more personal, metaphorical, and
philosophical, hoping to expand the meaning of citizenship, and in particular, the
conception of citizenship in America. It seeks to fulfill the promise of a land where
freedom can actually be held and realized by all Americans. It strives to include those
who hope to be recognized legally, not just culturally, as truly American.8
Two new books on the debate over immigration and citizenship exemplify these
divergent approaches to immigration law, and each offers unique and intriguing
contributions to this "peculiar" yet vibrant area of American jurisprudence. 9 Consistent
with the respective traditions into which they fall, these books, Anna 0. Law, The

characterized as xenophobic." (footnotes omitted)).
5. See Shruti Rana, "Streamlining" the Rule of Law: How the Department of Justice is Undermining
Judicial Review of Agency Action, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 829 (2009) (arguing U.S. deportation policy and
adjudication should be conducted in a less arbitrary manner and discretionary authority over deportation should
be modified); see, e.g., Julia Preston, PoliticalBattle on Illegal Immigration Shifts to States, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
1, 2010, at Al; Tim Rutten, On Immigration, It's up to Washington, L.A. TIMES, May 5, 2010, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/05/opinion/la-oe-0505-rutten-20100505;
Peter H. Schuck, Op-ed.,
Birthrightofa Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2010, at Al9.
6. See Bassina Farbenblum, Executive Deference in U.S. Refugee Law: InternationalistPaths Through
and Beyond Chevron, 60 DUKE L.J. 1059 (2011); Claire R. Kelly, The BrandX Liberation: Doing Away with
Chevron's Second Step as well as Other DoctrinesofDeference, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 151, 174 n. 111 (2010)
("A fundamental premise of the immigration enforcement process must be that the substantive regulations
codified in title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations are binding in all administrative settings, and this
specifically includes substantive regulations interpreting and applying the provisions of the Act. Of course, the
Service and the Board are bound by the decisions of the federal courts, but even the federal courts owe
deference to authoritative agency interpretations of the substantive provisions of the Act, within the limits
recognized by the Supreme Court.") (citations omitted) (quoting Board of Immigration Procedure: Procedural
Reforms Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54878, 54878-01 (Aug. 26, 2002) (to be codified at 8
C.F.R. pt. 3)).
7. See, e.g., Keith Aoki et al., (In)visible Cities: Three Local Government Models and Immigration
Regulation, 10 OR. REV. INT'L L. 453 (2008); Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of
ImmigrationLaw, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2007).
8. See, e.g., Michelle A. McKinley, Conviviality, Cosmopolitan Citizenship, and Hospitality, 5 UNBOUND:
HARv. J. LEGAL LEFT 55 (2009); Ragini Shah, Sharing the American Dream: Towards Formalizing the Status
of Long-Term Resident Undocumented Children in the United States, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 637
(2008).
9. Michele Benedetto, Crisison the Immigration Bench: An Ethical Perspective, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 467,
507 (2008) (recognizing "the constantly changing world of immigration law" that judges and BIA members
must be aware of); Theo Liebmann, Family Court and the Unique Needs of Children and Families Who Lack
Immigration Status, 40 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 583, 603 (2007) (stating "[i]mmigration law is a constantly
changing area. . . .").
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Immigration Battle in American Courts,10 and Ediberto Romin, Citizenship and Its
Exclusions: A Classical, Constitutional, and Critical Race Critique,1' contrast along
many dimensions, including their approaches to deciphering the current state of
American immigration law and the meaning of citizenship as well as their narrative style
and the empirical approaches each author deploys in search of answers to these
dilemmas..
ANNA 0. LAW, THE IMMIGRATION BATTLE IN AMERICAN COURTS.

Anna Law's new book falls into the first category of immigration jurisprudence
identified above - she takes a procedural approach to unraveling the complex and often
inscrutable immigration cases emanating from the U.S. courts of appeals and the U.S.
Supreme Court. She focuses on how each court's evolving institutional context affects
its decision-making.1 2 Professor Law, a political scientist at DePaul University,
conducted detailed empirical analyses of the Supreme Court and several U.S. courts of
appeals, interviewing judges and examining the different approaches the Supreme Court
and the courts of appeals' 3 have taken to immigration cases across time. 14
She begins her book with an interesting premise. She questions whether the
Supreme Court and the U.S. courts of appeals treat immigration cases in a similar
fashion, and employs empirical data to examine divergences in how these courts treat
immigrants. She argues that her data analysis shows that the U.S. Supreme Court and
U.S. courts of appeals have gradually begun treating non-citizens' petitions to remain in
this country in markedly different ways. 15 Professor Law's analysis is driven by the
question of why immigrants' chances of success (as measured by denial of deportation,
exclusion, or a grant of citizenship) decrease as their cases move towards the Supreme
Court. As Law notes, this question takes on an added gravity because the consequences
of deportation and exclusion decisions are often so severe; the stakes involved can
sometimes literally lead to a decision marking a non-citizen for life or death. 16 From
here, she contends that the federal judiciary's path appears to have "taken a [radically]
different form than the one envisioned by the [founding fathers]." 17 She argues that the
Supreme Court, at least in a structural sense, has deviated from its original mission by
10. LAW, supra note 6.
11. ROMAN, supra note 3.
12. LAW, supranote 6, at 3.
13. Specifically, Professor Law focused on the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits in her evaluations of the
U.S. courts of appeals. See id. at 12, 83-87.
14. Id. at 2.
15. Id.
16. LAW, supra note 6, at 4. According to Senator Patrick Leahy (D. Vt.), for "an asylum seeker with a
valid claim of persecution in her home country, a denial may be tantamount to a death sentence." Improving
Efficiency and Ensuring Justice in the Immigration Court System, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration,Refugees, and Border Security, 112 Cong. (2011) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S.
Comm. on Judiciary). See also John Lantigua, In Asylum Cases, Immigration Judges Under a Lot of Pressure,
PALM BEACH POST (May 10, 2008), http://www.palmbeachpost.com/localnews/content/state/epaper/2008/05/1
0/mlajudges 051 1.html (quoting Judge Dana Marks, President of the National Association of Immigration
Judges, who notes that asylum cases can be like "death penalty cases" since some people may face death if
asylum is denied); Jacqueline Stevens, Lawless Courts, THE NATION (Nov. 8, 2010),
http://www.thenation.com/article/155497/lawless-courts.
17. LAW, supra note 6, at 3.
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becoming more of a policy court than a court of law. She contrasts this role with that of
the courts of appeals, which she sees as having taken on more of an error-correction role
in the immigration arena, noting that in most cases they have become the courts of last
resort for immigrants.18
Professor Law ultimately concludes "that the Supreme Court and [U.S.] Courts of
Appeals [now] operate in [distinctly] different . . . contexts, and that each court's unique
institutional context acts as a filtering mechanism that shapes the judges' perception[s]
of' their roles and actions. 19 In her view, these courts have not played a static but rather
a dynamic role in the federal judicial system over time. She then explores the
consequences of these dynamic roles, both for the courts themselves and for the
immigrants who appear before them. 2 0
In particular, after noting that both courts are supposed to be concerned with
"stable sets of rules, procedures, and norms," 2 1 Professor Law claims that both empirical
and anecdotal data appear to show that the U.S. Supreme Court has transformed from an
appellate court into much more of a policy court, "that is, a court that that thinks in
terms of grand ideas of jurisprudence and policy rather than focusing on the facts of the
23
individual cases, as a court of appeals devoted to the correction of errors might do."
She then concludes that the U.S. courts of appeals are in a number of instances "engaged
in seemingly purpose[ful] behavior to either shirk existing precedent or congressional
intent in order to find in favor of the [non-citizen]." 24 She questions this development in
light of the deference the courts owe to Congress and the deference the lower courts owe
to the Supreme Court, especially given her claim that immigration law is characterized
by "strong and unequivocal doctrinal directives" 25 from the Supreme Court. She then
claims that immigration law is the ultimate test case for such claims about the courts'
roles, although she qualifies this latter assertion by noting that immigration law is
perhaps uniquely characterized by strong government power and a lack of individual
power.."26

Professor Law's tireless empirical work is impressive and her institutional analysis
is thought-provoking. Her constitutional originalism, and the sharp lines she draws
between law and policy, will not sit well with legal scholars, although they are not her
chosen audience. She argues that the now-"evolved federal judiciary has taken a
different form from the one envisioned by the founders, but this new form has simply
redistributed the missions and duties of the judicial institution to its different segments.
In the end", in her ultimate analysis,, "the federal judiciary may have wandered from the
structural design intended by the founders, but the roles and missions that the founders
wished the judiciary to serve in the political system are still being carried out" 27 While
18. See LAW, supra note 6, at 4, ch. 3.

19. Id. at 3.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 12.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 13.
LAW, supra note 6, at 8.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 7 (quoting Schuck, supra note 1, at 1).
Id. at 3.
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many may disagree with these assertions, or simply find them unremarkable from a legal
perspective, Professor Law's argument could be strengthened by tackling head-on two
issues which she addresses only briefly.
First, Professor Law sets up a somewhat circular argument with her claim that
immigration law is an ideal test case for the institutional analysis she carries out. She
notes that immigration law is often singled out for its insulation and isolation from other
areas of American law because of the high level of judicial deference accorded to
immigration decisions and the level of political interference in immigration cases. 28 She
then concludes that the Supreme Court has evolved from the forum envisioned by its
founders into much more of a "policy" court than a court of law in the immigration
arena.29 In this sense, then, immigration law is not necessarily the ideal test case
Professor Law describes it as - it is (and has been) a highly politicized area of the
law, 30 and this politicization is, not surprisingly, reflected in the decisions of the
Supreme Court. Moreover, the high level of deference to the executive involved in
immigration decisions is likely to intensify the political nature of immigration decisionmaking, particularly at the Supreme Court. Thus, her claims about the Supreme Court's
role - whether seen through her policy-law dichotomy or as a novel form of deference to
administrative agencies - appear limited to the immigration arena. At a minimum, one
should tread with caution in interpolating her conclusions to the Court's decision-making
in another area of law. 3 ' Furthermore, her analysis and conclusions appear to rely
perhaps too heavily on her formulation of an originalist perspective on the roles of the
courts, and her analysis could be deepened by delving further into the differences or
similarities she finds between the model she characterizes as originalist and the results of
her contemporary research. Getting beyond the distraction of what was or was not the
intent of the founders and exploring the relative strengths and weaknesses of alternative
models would allow the reader to focus on the evident core of her concerns. Again,
these insights will not seem as fresh to legal academics, but may provide interesting
fodder for political scientists approaching these issues.
Second, in coming to her claim that the U.S. courts of appeals have begun acting as
28. There can frequently be politicized interactions between the judiciary and Congress on immigration
issues. For example, a former Department of Justice liaison to the White House, Monica Goodling, testified
before Congress that the Bush Administration's hiring policy on immigration judges was based on political ties
and ideological beliefs, not experience in the field. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF
ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE

ATTORNEY
GENERAL
110-11,
116
(July
28,
2008),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0807/finalpdf;
Steven H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration
Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635 (2010); Fatma E. Marouf, Implicit Bias and Immigration Courts, 45 NEW
ENG. L. REv. 417 (2011).
29. LAW, supra note 6, at 9.
30. The politicization of immigration law is not confined to the halls of Congress, or more recently, the
state and municipal legislatures. Additionally, Professional Michael A. Olivas noted that "immigrant-bashing
has a long and venerable tradition in U.S. politics," which further illustrates the politicized nature of
immigration. Michael A. Olivas, Lawmakers Gone Wild? College Residency and the Response to Professor
Kobach, 61 SMU L. REv. 99, 130 (2008). Professor Olivas also points to a rise in media pundits, such as Lou
Dobbs, who espouse anti-immigration views, which, in turn, can further politicize immigration law. Id. at 10405.
31. But see Shruti Rana, Chevron Without the Courts? The Supreme Court's Chevron Revision Project
Through an Immigration Lens, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. (forthcoming) (discussing the role of immigration cases
as predictive of Supreme Court attitudes).
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error-correction courts in the immigration law arena, Professor Law gives short shrift to
two significant recent developments in immigration law which did much to transform the
role of the courts of appeals in immigration cases.
Many of the recent changes in immigration adjudication can be traced to the
Department of Justice's restructuring of the immigration agency in the aftermath of
September 11, 2001.32 A surge of cases that began even before the terrorist attacks led
the Department to institute "streamlining" reforms in 2001, which greatly enhanced the
level of discretion accorded to agency decision-makers and correspondingly sought to
limit the discretion the courts of appeals had over the decisions that ultimately reached
them. 33
As Professor Law herself notes, these changes led many appellate judges to begin
to see their role as an increasingly error-correction one in the immigration context. The
judges saw increasingly numbers of sloppy, ill-considered agency cases arriving in their
dockets and started losing trust in the agency itself. As the courts of appeals, particularly
the Ninth and Second Circuits, were inundated with immigration cases, they became
increasingly critical of an agency they felt was failing to fulfill its allotted role of fair,
careful adjudication and meaningful review by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
over the work of individual immigration judges. This failure, the judges believed,
shifted the burden of error-correction to the courts of appeals. 34 Appellate judges in
several circuits cited the agency's repeated failures to comply with the rule of law,
finding that "adjudication of these cases at the administrative level has fallen below the
minimum standards of legal justice," 35 and they, and others, repeatedly criticized the
Board for "rubberstamping" cases to reduce the agency's caseload. 36 Professor Law cites
judges she interviewed who "stated over and over again that they were dismayed by the
lack of quality control at the BIA and the routine summary affirmances the Board
issued." 37
Compounding these problems were the ways in which both agency rules and
congressional legislation have circumscribed the courts of appeals' discretionary
decision-making authority in immigration cases. 38 For example, in addition to the
agency's streamlining rules, which sought to strip the federal courts of discretionary
authority to review immigration agency decisions except in limited circumstances, 39
Congress passed several acts stripping the courts of appeals of jurisdiction to review

32. Rana, supranote 5, at 832.
33. See id. at 843-44.
34. LAW, supra note 6, at 186-87.
35. Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005) ("This tension between judicial and
administrative adjudicators is not due to judicial hostility to the nation's immigration policies or to a
misconception of the proper standard of judicial review of administrative decisions. It is due to the fact that the
adjudication of these cases at the administrative level has fallen below the minimum standards of legal
justice."). See also Brian G. Slocum, Canons, the PlenaryPower Doctrine, and Immigration Law, 34 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 363, 401 (2007) ("When a court ignores congressional intent and aggressively interprets a statute in
favor of an alien by applying the avoidance canon, and thus does not act as a 'faithful agent' of Congress, it can
still be said to act with restraint by not deciding the case on constitutional grounds.").
36. See LAW, supra note 6, at 177-78.
37. Id. at 183.
38. Id. at 182-84; see Rana, supra note 5, at 832-34.
39. See Rana, supra note 5, at 835-36.
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certain types of immigration issues in the 1990s.40
Both of these factors appear to have a played a large role in driving the courts of
appeals into a broad (and perhaps expanding) error-correction role as they dealt with the
unprecedented wave of immigration appeals over the last decade; these changes went
well beyond merely "reinforc[ing]" the courts of appeals' error-correction mission, as
Professor Law describes it.41 In this light, the evolution of the courts of appeals to more
of an error-correction court arguably stems more from the historical contingencies of the
last decade, mostly occurring at the immigration agency and spreading through to the
courts of appeals, rather than from a true institutional evolution.42 That is, from a legal
and historical perspective, it appears that the courts of appeals and Supreme Court have
not so much changed or evolved their roles, but rather the post-9/11 changes have
heavily underscored or emphasized certain functions the courts were forced to deal with
as they faced a sudden onslaught of immigration cases. In this sense, Professor Law's
analysis points to a sharpening of already existing roles and divisions of responsibilities
between the courts rather than a truly novel institutional transformation with broader
implications.
While Professor Law provides a wide ranging and detailed longitudinal study of
the Supreme Court and several courts of appeals, an even larger data set would help
strengthen or further refine her arguments. For example, while Professor Law conducts
an excellent analysis of these developments at the Ninth Circuit, she provides far less
data on the Second Circuit, the other federal appellate court most flooded by immigration
cases. 43 This data set would have presumably provided fertile areas of comparison with
the data collected on the Supreme Court and other courts of appeals. 44
In sum, Professor Law has written a detailed and insightful analysis of the
changing nature of our highest courts. She demonstrates how seemingly minute
institutional changes can bring about severe consequences for immigrants, the courts of
appeals, and the U.S. Supreme Court, leading them further away from what Professor
Law sees as the founders' original intent for these individual institutions. Yet, Professor
Law ends her analysis on a positive note, concluding that while the respective roles of
the Supreme Court and courts of appeals have diverged or been redistributed, at least in
the immigration context, nonetheless in her view and overall, these two courts, working
in tandem, do still do play a constructive role of the judiciary in our political system.

40. See LAW, supra note 6, at 156-57; see also Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40, 42
U.S.C.); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110
Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 & 18 U.S.C.).
41. LAW, supra note 6, at 186.
42. See, e.g., Rana, supra note 5, at 843 (describing the influx of appeals at the Department of Justice and
the Attorney General's response aimed at increasing the discretionary authority and speed of agency decision
making). See also Hobbs Act, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 106, 75 Stat. 650, 651-53 (1961) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (routing most federal appeals of immigration agency decisions directly to the
U.S. courts of appeals).
43. See John R.B. Palmer et al., Why Are so Many People Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals
Decisions in Federal Court? An Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitionsfor Review, 20 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 3 (2005).
44. LAW, supranote 6, at 187.
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EDIBERTO ROMAN, CITIZENSHIP AND ITS EXCLUSIONS:

A CLASSICAL, CONSTITUTIONAL, AND CRITICAL RACE CRITIQUE.
In his recent book, Citizenship and Its Exclusions: A Classical,Constitutional,and
Critical Race Critique, Ediberto RomAn approaches similar questions involving
immigration and citizenship from a completely different perspective - he questions and
analyzes how our notion of citizenship has itself been constructed, and in particular, how
the citizenship concept has been expanded and restricted.
While Professor Law's book focuses on empirical data and a relatively narrow
subset of time and space to analyze the current immigration battle in the United States,
Professor RomAn, a legal scholar at Floirda International University, takes on a much
broader view of the idea of citizenship. He explores the roots of the present day
American citizenship construct with a far more personal and philosophical approach than
Professor Law.
Professor Romin's primary contribution to the citizenship debate is an intriguing
one: he claims that the citizenship construct underlying American jurisprudence is not
based on equality and a democratic ethos, as is commonly assumed. Instead, he argues
that American citizenship, and Western ideas of citizenship, have a history of often
hidden exclusionary precepts that ultimately operate to deny all American citizens the
rights and privileges to which they are entitled. 45
First, he traces the ideal versions of citizenship, as posited in Western thought,
since classical times, all the while pointing to ways that citizenship has often been used
for exclusionary rather than inclusory purposes. 46 He then moves to a detailed analysis
of how, despite the ideal of American citizenship invoked in political and democratic
rhetoric, American citizenship still has significant, and often overlooked, exclusionary
facets. For example, he distinguishes between de jure and de facto citizenship
exclusions, explaining how groups like Puerto Ricans, while ostensibly American
citizens, are barred from exercising full American citizenship rights. 4 7 He then takes on
the topic of de facto exclusions, explaining that although groups like African Americans
are legally entitled to the full privileges of citizenship, in practice, systematic forms of
oppression operate to deny them the ability to fully exercise those rights.48
This contribution identifies possible holes in the current American citizenship
construct and points out areas for future work to ensure that all American citizens can
exercise the rights and privileges to which they are entitled. In pursuit of this goal, one of
Professor Romin's key suggestions is that that international human rights norms can and
should help inform these debates. In attempting to incorporate these norms explicitly
into the American citizenship construct, he offers a path towards a truly universal
concept of citizenship, one based on inclusion rather than exclusion. This concept offers
a fertile area for further research. However, building such a truly universal concept of
citizenship, or even making meaningful progress in that direction, remains a daunting
task, which in many ways has merely begun.
45.
46.
47.
48.

ROMAN, supranote 3, at xi.
See id at 15-81.
See id at 97-98.
Seeid.at119.
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Taken together, both Law's and Romin's books offer fascinating insights into the
current state of immigration law and make valuable contributions to the contemporary
debates about the ever-evolving concept of American citizenship.
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